Pegasus Airlines flight 2193, a Boeing 737-800, suffered a runway excursion after landing on runway 06 at Istanbul-Sabiha Gökçen International Airport, Turkey. There were 177 occupants on the aircraft. The Turkish Health Minister reported that one occupant had died, 157 were injured.
At 18:19 Pegasus 2193 touched down but failed to come to a complete stop on the runway. It overran and went down an embankment, breaking in three. The aircraft came to rest about 20 m below runway elevation.
The second accident comes a month after a Pegasus plane with 164 people on board skidded off the runway in Istanbul at the same airport.
Pegasus is similar to Ryanair, called Lowcost, cheap and cheerful. They are flying mostly A320neo as all there accidents within 3 years have been with the 737.
The details concerning the accident have commenced being clear:
Active Runway during the accident Runway 06, ATC reporting the Wind says 270 degrees /22 Knots Gust 37 Knots. The controller should have canceled the traffic due to the deteriorating tailwind. 270/22 K and 37 Gust (Crossing Component More than 20 Knots) and controller says ” cleared to land”. Here is the critical/ vital point, the chain of errors is being released by ATS Controller.
This means It would not be possible to have a stabilized approach on approach plate for Boeing 737-800.
Pilots are accepting the ATC Controller and read back to tower ” clear to land” Although Controller reminded pilots last 2-landing aircraft would have to execute Missed Approach Procedures.
There is no reason to be persistent insistent in the context of going on an unstabilized approach. That s all. Stop writing more.
LTFJ 051520Z 29022G37KT 240V330 7000 -TSRA FEW017CB BKN025 BKN070 11/09 Q0992 RESHRA NOSIG RMK RWY24 33010G20KT 270V360
Wind 290/22 K Gust 37, Wet Runway, 2500 feet 5/8 Cloud Ceiling, Vicinity CB in effect at 1700 feet, a thunderstorm is passing.
There is nothing to say about the landing decision of Pilots.
However, CRM may be the most preceding effect in this accident, Foreign First officer didn’t understand the advisories of the controller because spoken Turkish.
The deficiencies in understanding the instructions by First Officer can affect aviation safety through its effect on how the flight crew deals with difficult situations. Shortly, It s very clear to say ” There s a huge problem in CRM”. First Officer could have prevented the accident, If he understood the discussion between Captain and Controller in Turkish, This issue must be solved by the urgent decision making of the Turkish Civil Aviation Authority.
Electronic Data based on ADS B, Mode C Records:
First thing needs to be checked is the one if the Airplane had stabilized descend.
Stabilized descend requires 600/700 descent rate on ILS path, Aircraft rate of descending ıs more than 900 feet/min. That can be accepted like a steep approach.
Let s take a look at the airspeed. Vref speed on the threshold for Boeing 737 with 175 Passenger should be around 145 Knots. But ADS B says the threshold speed 185 Knots, much more than expected. That can trigger the rolling distance to increase and Pilotage skills associated with the increased tailwind vector. To some extent, If the center of gravity of the airplane is a little bit aft it will become more unstable on landing, the yoke may not be controlling the pitch attitudes of the airplane. The sequential effect is the longer round-out and flare distances to get the plane landed on the runway. ADS B Track confirms that touchdown speed is 130 K, and seemingly, hard landing because of the decreasing performance of the elevator (Pitch Control)
That s all I have now.
I hope they all stay safe and my prayers are with them #pegasus
Written by UMIT OZTURK